Federal Criminal Lawyer Blog

Criminal defense lawyers here in Atlanta, throughout Georgia and the rest of the Nation, whether in federal court or state court, all need to be aware of developments in the law, especially such hot topic areas like search and seizure. Many attorneys are able to either win, or at least put their client's case in a better posture, by pointing out that the investigating officials either did or came close to going over the Constitutional line when obtaining incriminating evidence. I've written in earlier posts about how more and more courts are grappling with search and seizure rules when applying modern technology to the Fourth Amendment, the rule created by the Founders of our country in the 18th century.

Another of these rulings came out the other day, and was issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. That case held that when the police arrest a person, they generally cannot look through the person's cell phone unless they first get a warrant. The First Circuit case applies to federal criminal matters that arise in Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Puerto Rico. An earlier ruling by the Seventh Circuit (which is governing authority in federal cases in Illinois, indiana and Wisconsin) came to a different result, holding that no warrant is needed. Look to see this issue going up the the United States Supreme Court at some point in the not too distant future.

In the First Circuit case, the police had probable cause to arrest the Defendant for being involved in a suspected drug deal. They then got his phone out of his pocket, and by pushing a couple of buttons, they then got information as to his home address. They went to the residence, put officers inside to make sure his wife did not destroy anything, and then got a warrant to search the house. In the house they found lots of drugs and a weapon, leading to the Defendant's ultimate 22-year prison sentence. He appealed, arguing that the search of his phone was illegal, and that illegality led to the identification of his house and search there. The First Circuit agreed and reversed his conviction.

The Fourth Amendment says that there shall not be any search unless based on probable cause and after a judge has issued a warrant. We all know that this rule is riddled with holes like Swiss cheese. One such hole is the "search incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment. This rule says that potential danger to the police and the need to look for evidence before it can be destroyed are reasons why law enforcement officials are permitted to engage in a warrantless search of the arrested person, his belongings and anything he has near him. The cases say that the cops can look through wallets, purses, and the like, but cannot get into boxes or vehicles that are some distance away from the arrested person.

Enter the modern cell phone, which is no bigger than wallets and purses, and oftentimes much smaller. However, more and more courts are recognizing that size ain't everything, for as we all know, our cell phones are often repositories of extraordinary amounts of information, much of which is highly confidential and personal. The prosecutors in the First Circuit case argued that a cell phone is no bigger than a wallet, and the same search rules should therefore apply. However, the First Circuit noted that the "eighty-five percent of Americans who own cell phones and who use the devices to do much more than make phone calls" would probably be surprised to know that their government equated these technological marvels with a wallet. The First Circuit instead recognized that cell phones are actually compact computers, with vast storage capability, and that most folks keep an array of private information on these devices. As a result, the court said that the wallet analogy does not work. If the police want to look through the cell phone of an arrested person, they need to get a warrant.

Now, a caveat. The First Circuit sits in Boston, where the Marathon bombing still is causing shockwaves throughout the community. The First Circuit therefore noted that its ruling did not apply to "exigent circumstances" cases, which are situations in which an emergency situation requires immediate law enforcement action with no need to first get a warrant from a judge. "We assume that the exigent circumstances exception would allow the police to conduct an immediate, warrantless search of a cell phone's data where they have probable cause to believe that the phone contains evidence of
a crime, as well as a compelling need to act quickly that makes it impracticable for them to obtain a warrant -- for example, where the phone is believed to contain evidence necessary to locate a kidnapped child or to investigate a bombing plot or incident."

This is an important case. We will keep track of further developments, so we can use this and other recent cases to help clients we represent.

In any criminal case, whether in Federal Court or one of the State Court systems, prosecutors are supposed to "play fair". The Fifth Amendment to our dear Old Constitution enshrines this fairness obligation in what we lawyers call the "Due Process Clause." Yesterday was the 50th anniversary of the day in 1963 when the United State Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling of Brady v. Maryland. That was the case in which, for the first time, the Supreme Court said that the Due Process Clause mandates that a prosecutor play fair by telling the defense about any exculpatory evidence, or evidence that tends to show that the defendant was not guilty. However, as basic as this obligation seems to be, I often wonder if our clients are that much better off than 50 years ago.

Like defendants in many famous Supreme Court cases, John Brady was no saint. On June 27, 1958, he and Donald Boblit robbed and killed a man named William Brooks. Boblit quickly confessed that he had strangled Brooks to death, and that he acted alone. However, the prosecutors handling the case against John Brady never informed the defense attorneys about this confession and never turned over the transcript of Boblit's remarks.

Both Boblit and Brady were convicted and sentenced to death. Only after the trial did Brady's lawyers discover that prosecutors had a confession from Boblit that helped exonerate Brady. The attorneys found out by reading a transcript of Boblit's trial. So, Brady's attorneys sensibly asked for a new trial. The trial judge refused. Next, the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that the suppression of the confession violated Brady's Due Process rights, but said he was only entitled to a new sentencing trial. Because his lawyers believed the whole trial had been tainted, they asked the United States Supreme Court to look into the matter.

The justices used Brady's case to memorialize a constitutional rule that imposed on prosecutors the affirmative duty to share with criminal defendants evidence that by its very definition would undermine the prosecution's case. The motives behind the suppression of the evidence didn't matter. However, in later years the Supreme Court greatly reduced the impact of this landmark ruling, by holding that an unfair prosecutor who hides exculpatory evidence will not cause a new trial unless that hidden evidence was "material". Evidence is material, only when "there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." This was a big victory for prosecutors and an even bigger defeat for aggrieved defendants.

As a young lawyer, I was kind of shocked about how the Brady rule is played out in a real case. I would always ask the Judge to make the prosecutor turn over the "Brady materials." The prosecutor would routinely roll his or her eyes, and intone that the government was well aware of its obligations, and that was it. The judge never made any inquiries, and I was left with the distinct impression that the Brady rule is merely an example of the fox guarding the henhouse. Why would a prosecutor ever turn over evidence that helps the Defendant if the prosecutor truly believes the Defendant is guilty? Furthermore, even if a prosecutor is not trying to hide anything, it seems ridiculous to ask that same prosecutor to figure out if a piece of evidence is potentially exculpatory, in that the prosecutor does not really know where the defense is going. Federal court is the worst of all, in that the discovery rules do not make a prosecutor turn over very much at all, and so no one really knows if there is some truly good defense evidence lurking in the files of one of the investigators.

Not only does the Brady rule seem to fall flat in real cases, it seems that when a prosecutor is caught withholding evidence, very little is done. Prosecutors who violate the obligation to disclose favorable evidence are rarely sanctioned by courts, and almost never by disciplinary bodies. I remember one case where I caught the prosecutor red-handed. Fortunately, my client was acquitted. When I complained about the prosecutor's violation, his boss shrugged, saying "Why does it matter, you walked your man didn't you?" That attitude seems to still prevail 50 years after the Brady decision was issued. Things might be better if all prosecutors would simply use an "open file" discovery system, but for some reason, they often are reluctant to do so. That is truly bizarre, since when there is a fight over money, each side has to make full disclosure to the other, but when freedom (or even the death sentence) is at issue, one side gets to hide the ball and only has to turn over exculpatory evidence when it is "material." Have we really improved since 1963?

We handle lots of federal criminal cases. The various rules governing these cases are the same here in Georgia, they are the same when we take cases in Florida or Alabama, and we work under the same rules whenever we take cases in other parts of the country. Every so often, there are proposals to change the rules, and these amendments need to be first approved by the United States Supreme Court before they can be sent to Congress for ratification. Several weeks ago, the Supreme Court approved a series of rule changes that federal court practitioners need to keep up with in order to do the best job possible for their clients. Two of the bigger changes are discussed below.

One of the biggest rule changes concerns criminal cases involving immigration crimes or clients who are not U.S. Citizens Recall that under the landmark case of Padilla v. Kentucky, it is ineffective assistance of counsel if the lawyer does not tell his alien client that a guilty plea can have ramifications on the defendant's immigration status. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure discusses what happens when anybody pleads guilty to a crime in federal court. The Supreme Court approved a change which requires the judge, before accepting a guilty plea, to ensure that the defendant understands “that, if convicted, a defendant who is not a United States citizen may be removed from the United States, denied citizenship, and denied admission to the United States in the future.” The rule change seems to provide protection to both defendants (who will be told about what might happen) and prosecutors (who can argue on appeal or habeas that any failure by defense counsel to provide the advice required by Padilla was harmless because the court gave the defendant the required notice).

Another significant amendment concerns changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence. These are the rules that control what can, and cannot, be introduced by one side or the other during a federal trial. Many readers will be aware of a series of cases over the past decade in which Justice Scalia has breathed new life into the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. These cases held that criminal defendants have the right to see, confront and cross-examine any witness whose statement is used for an evidentiary purpose by the prosecution. The Supreme Court has approved changes to Rule 803 of the Rules of Evidence to allow, in a criminal case, admission of a government official’s certification of the absence of a public record if the prosecution gives the defendant notice of its intent to introduce the document fourteen days before trial and the defendant does not object within seven days before the trial. This revision seems to be a reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, which said that certain kinds of documentary evidence (such as a crime lab report indicating that a substance is cocaine) violates a criminal defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment if admitted into evidence without the document’s author being put on the stand to testify as to its contents. The new version of Rule 803 contains a procedure under which a defendant will waive that constitutional right – at least with respect to a certification testifying to the absence of a public record – if he does not object to its admission after receiving notice prior to trial.

Again, practitioners need to keep up with these changes to protect their client's rights. We will continue to look for changes and updates so we can do our best for our clients.

Sitting here in Atlanta, I really like when I find out about bright, energetic lawyers handling federal criminal cases all around the country. One such case is Burrage v. United States, where this past Tuesday the United States Supreme Court agreed to review important questions as to what it means when "death results" from drug dealing. To many lawyers and others in this field, it might seem that a case like this only really matters to folks defending drug cases. However, this is an important appeal on issues related to causation, the appropriateness of jury instructions, and construing federal statutes.

Mr. Burrage was like too many folks, caught up in the drug business, selling relatively small amounts of controlled substances. His life intersected with Joshua Banka, another lost soul who was a long-standing poly-substance abuser. Burrage sold some heroin to Banka, who died after using some of the drug. Banka had lots of other drugs in his system as well, and his girlfriend acknowledged he'd used some of these other drugs in the day before he died. The experts who testified at trial gave complex answers about the cause of Banka's death, but they could not say that Banka would not have died if he had not used heroin (this method of saying the word "not" three times in the same sentence appears in the briefs for each side of the case).

A federal statute requires a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for a person dealing drugs "if death results." At trial, the Defendant wanted the judge to tell the jury that selling heroin "played a substantial part" in bringing about the death, and that the death was a "direct result of or a reasonably probable consequence of" using the heroin. Mr. Burrage's attorney also wanted a jury instruction on the well-known first-year law school concept of "proximate cause" . The trial judge and the court of appeals rejected the Defendant's contentions, and said it was OK to tell the jury that it was enough if they decided that the heroin was a "contributing cause" of Mr. Banka’s death. The instruction told the jury that "a contributing cause is a factor that, although not the primary cause, played a part in the death[.]” The jury found Burrage guilty, the Court of Appeals rejected his arguments, and his very competent Iowa lawyer asked the United States Supreme Court to look at the case.

The government protested that the Supreme Court should not review the case because the "if death results" issue rarely comes up in federal criminal prosecutions, and that any dispute among the lower federal courts on these questions is really more of a tempest in a teapot. However, it seems that the Supreme Court believes this really is an important case, for they accepted Mr. Burrage's case for review and argument next Fall. The case will have important lessons for many other federal criminal prosecutions, issues as diverse as how to read a statute written in the passive voice ("if death results" is different than the active voice "caused death"), whether it is OK to construe a criminal statute with mandatory penalties in a manner akin to strict liability, and varying levels of "causation", a concept that applies in criminal and civil cases alike.

We look forward to the Briefs and arguments, and how this decision might affect the matters we handle for our clients. Stay tuned.

Here in Georgia a Defendant was stopped by the police, who thereafter found 1.3 grams of marijuana. Because of our State's relatively harsh drug laws, he was forced to plead guilty to drug distribution, although his lawyers were able to get the conviction expunged if the Defendant successfully completed a period of probation. However, the Defendant was not a U.S. Citizen. Two years later, immigration authorities threw him into custody to begin deportation proceedings. After a fight that took several more years, the United States Supreme Court yesterday held that this man was not automatically subject to deportation. The Supreme Court said that not all marijuana distribution offenses rise to the level of being an "aggravated felony", which in the immigration context means that the person is just about automatically deportable. The case is Moncrieffe v. Holder.

Mr. Moncrieffe is originally from Jamaica, but has legally lived here in the U.S. for many years. His lawyers faced the same dilemma we face when representing aliens accused of crimes, the question of whether a guilty plea might make the person subject to deportation (or "removal" as the term is now called). Like many people, Mr. Moncrieffe seemed ready to accept a deal that called for no jail time and expungement. Little did he know that the feds wanted to kick him out of the country for this relatively minor offense.

Under the immigration laws, a drug distribution crime falls into the category of "aggravated felonies". These more serious crimes make it almost impossible for an alien to avoid removal once the immigration authorities start their machinery in that direction. Pursuant to the immigration laws, a noncitizen convicted of an “aggravated felony” is not only deportable, but also is not eligible for discretionary relief. Under the immigration laws, an “aggravated felony” includes anything that is the “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance.” To understand yesterday's ruling, it is also important to realize that pursuant to the federal drug laws, marijuana distribution is a felony, but if it only involves "small amounts" that are distributed for no remuneration, then the offense is merely a misdemeanor.

The emerging star of this Supreme Court Term, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, wrote for the majority in the 7-2 opinion. Justice Sotomayor noted that under Georgia law, marijuana distribution encompasses a range of conduct from social sharing to distribution of larger amounts. She also noted an issue that has regularly bedeviled the federal courts: how to categorize a person's prior offenses. Over the recent decade, the Court seems to be inclined to use something called the "categorical" approach. Under this analysis, courts examine what the state conviction necessarily involved and not the facts underlying the case. In using this approach, the federal court assessing the impact of a prior conviction presumes that the conviction rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized. After using this "least serious version of the crime" approach, a judge is then supposed to determine whether even those acts are encompassed by the generic federal offense that is similar to the state crime at issue.

Justice Sotomayor then turned to how drug offenses are analyzed to see if they fall into the "aggravated felony" pigeonhole. She said that a state drug offense must meet two conditions: it must proscribe conduct that is an offense under the federal drug laws, and the federal drug laws must “necessarily” prescribe felony punishment for that conduct. Although possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is clearly a federal crime, as noted above it turns into a misdemeanor when it involves only a small amount distributed for no remuneration. The Georgia drug distribution statute includes people (like Mr. Moncrieffe here) who had small amounts of pot with no desire to be paid for sharing their stash. Using the categorical approach, federal courts must assume the least serious version of the crime, and therefore violation of this statute cannot be the "aggravated felony" that causes almost automatic deportation.

Again, this kind of case reveals the difficulty in defending clients who are not citizens. It also shows the problem in dealing with seemingly minor drug cases. People need to be careful when hiring lawyers for such matters, to make sure their attorney is up on the law and possible consequences of a conviction.

Hallelujiah! The Supreme Court yesterday continued its recent string of protecting all of our rights by reinvigorating the reach of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that police need a search warrant to get incriminating evidence from a suspect. Yesterday's case involved the forcible removal of blood from a drunk driving suspect. By an 8-1 margin the Court held that getting the blood without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. The case is Missouri v. McNeely.

In the early-morning hours of Oct. 3, 2010, Missouri State Highway Patrol Cpl. Mark Winder pulled over Tyler G. McNeely. McNeely, whose speech was slurred and who had alcohol on his breath, failed a field sobriety test and twice refused to take a breath test.
Winder arrested McNeely. While en route to the jail, the officer stopped by a hospital. McNeely refused to submit to a blood test. Officer Winder then ordered a technician to draw blood anyway. The officer later said he did not try and get a warrant because he thought Missouri law did not require it.

The Missouri Supreme Court unanimously disagreed and said the blood test could not be used. Courts nationwide were divided on the issue, which led the U.S. Supreme Court to take the case, and ultimately issue yesterday's ruling.

The prosecution argued that the natural dissipation of alcohol in a person's bloodstream was the reason the Supreme Court should create yet one more exception to the Fourth Amendment's rather clear mandate that there shall be no search or seizure unless based on a probable cause determination resulting in a warrant. Writing for herself and four other members of the majority, Justice Sotomayor rejected this argument. She said such emergencies must be determined by the circumstances in a case-by-case examination and rejected the notion that officers face a “now or never” situation in obtaining blood alcohol tests. “In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so,” Sotomayor wrote.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. agreed with the outcome of the case,but criticized the vagueness of the majority’s test. “If there is time to secure a warrant before blood can be drawn, the police must seek one,” Roberts wrote. “If an officer could reasonably conclude that there is not sufficient time to seek and receive a warrant, or he applies for one but does not receive a response before blood can be drawn, a warrantless blood draw may ensue.”

I have written posts here and here about the seeming resurgence in the Supreme Court's inclination to protect individual liberties against over-intrusive police practices. We hope this trend continues, for it is perfectly reasonable to have effective law enforcement alongside a robust respect for personal liberty and freedom.

In a earlier posts, I wrote about the Supreme Court's "dog sniff" cases, the former in which the Defendant was stopped while driving his truck and a drug dog eventually alerted to the presence of dogs, the latter case where (based on a "tip") the police walked a drug detector dog on the Defendant's porch, the pooch alerted, and based on that they got a warrant to search the house. As I predicted, the Supreme Court affirmed the search of the truck, and yesterday, they sided with the homeowner in the sniff that took place on the porch of the home. Yesterday's case is Florida v. Jardines, and by a 5-4 margin the Court held that the sniff on the porch was illegal as being a search not done pursuant to a warrant.

The opinion resulted in a somewhat unusual alignment of justices. Justice Scalia, perhaps the Court's most conservative member, wrote the majority decision. He was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, a frequent ally, and three of the court’s more liberal members, Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan.

Justice Scalia said the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches, is particularly concerned with the home and its immediate surroundings. When a dog on a leash roams around the outside of a residence, this is a tremendously different intrusion than visits from Halloween trick-or-treaters. “To find a visitor knocking on the door is routine (even if sometimes unwelcome),” Justice Scalia wrote. “To spot that same visitor exploring the front porch with a metal detector, or marching his bloodhound into the garden before saying hello and asking permission, would inspire most of us to — well, call the police.”

Justice Scalia grounded his opinion in property rights. This is the same theory he espoused when he wrote the opinion last year in Jones v. United States, the now-famous GPS case where a unanimous Court overturned years of practice by holding that placing a GPS monitor on the underside of a suspect's vehicle is a "search" that must be supported by a warrant.

In yesterday's case, Justice Kagan wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. They would also have relied on the "usual" rationale that looks to a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy." This seems to set up future battles, as noted by Justice Sotomayor's spirited concurrence in the GPS case where she wrote: "[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. ...This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers. ... I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year. But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection."

Again, we watch these cases closely, not only to help our clients, but also to predict future cases. Stay tuned!

As I noted in this post, on Tuesday the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kaley v. United States, a case calling on the Justices to answer the question of whether the Sixth and Fifth Amendments afford a Defendant the right to a pretrial hearing to challenge the seizure of her assets under the federal forfeiture laws when that seizure basically prevents her from hiring and paying for counsel of her choice. It is more than a little ironic that they decided to review the case on the same day we were all celebrating the 50th anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright, the landmark case ruling by the Supreme Court that everybody facing felony charges has the right to an attorney, even if he or she cannot afford to pay the lawyer. While we have made strides in the past five decades, in many ways we are worse off when a person faces the wrath of the federal government bent on a criminal prosecution.

On the one hand, we still have a long way to go when we provide counsel to people who cannot afford to pay for a lawyer. Many wonderful lawyers are public defenders who struggle to provide the best defense they can while handling massive and crushing caseloads. While Defendants have the "right" to an attorney, far too often the system is set up so that the public defender simply cannot spend much time with any one client, more or less rendering meaningless the Constitutional "right to counsel" enshrined in the Gideon case.

On the other hand, people facing federal criminal prosecutions face additional difficulties. First, as we have mentioned many times, and as I have written and spoken about on numerous occasions, there is a big difference between a State criminal case and a prosecution handled by the federal government. Federal criminal cases are often exceedingly complex, time-consuming, and beyond the abilities of many otherwise fine lawyers who simply are not equipped to handle the often arcane and weird aspects of defending a criminal case in federal court. Federal criminal defense is a speciality, and like other professions, specialists usually cost a lot more money, which makes it difficult for many people to defend themselves against charges in federal court. Second, defending a case in federal court also puts a Defendant (and his or her attorney) up against a series of very pro-prosecution laws. During the 1980's and 1990's, the U.S. Congress regularly enacted more and more "tough on crime" laws. Some of these laws increased sentences (like the horrible crack cocaine laws and mandatory minimum punishments). Other "crime prevention" legislation was aimed at people in the drug trade, and many statutes were designed to go after the money involved in the drug business. One of these laws greatly increased the scope of the federal forfeiture statutes, which are the laws that permit the feds to sometimes get money or property that was involved in or obtained from certain crimes. And, here's where it all comes back to the Kaley case accepted by the Supreme Court. That is the case where the Justices will need to answer the question of whether the feds can "restrain" a Defendant's assets even before a trial, without the need for a hearing where the Defendant can challenge the prosecutor's evidence. The expansion of forfeiture laws, which were mostly designed to go after dope dealers, is now being used against businesspeople like Mrs. Kaley, in a case that seems from the surface to be a contract dispute!

The right to counsel is important, whether or not a person has the assets to hire counsel, and regardless of whether the case is in State or federal court. We certainly hope that the Justices will recognize that Defendants in federal cases should have the right to use their assets to hire the specialists needed to defend matters in federal court, which is just as important as providing counsel for those without such assets.

Defending federal crimes is always difficult, whether the client is a "white collar" defendant charged with fraud or whether prosecutors charge other crimes, like drug violations. However, the defense is made more difficult in federal court by virtue of the prosecutor's ability to sometimes freeze and then forfeit all of the Defendant's assets. Making it more difficult still, the laws sometimes permit prosecutors to freeze the Defendant's assets even without a hearing in front of a judge! After many years of uncertainty, the Supreme Court the other day agreed to hear a case as to whether the pretrial restraint (or freezing) of a Defendant's assets is permissible if done without a hearing. The case is Kaley v. United States, and the certiorari petition is here.

Ms. Kaley was in the business of selling medical equipment. She and her husband apparently made a good living selling equipment that certain manufacturers no longer wanted. The federal authorities claimed these practices were fraudulent, and indicted the couple. Prosecutors also filed an ex parte request to restrain and freeze much of the couple's assets, claiming that the money they had in the bank and which they'd used to buy their house was obtained as proceeds of the fraudulent conduct charged in the indictment. A Federal Magistrate Judge agreed, and issued an order freezing their assets so they could not be used by the couple to defend themselves. The case has had a complex history, with two trips already to the Court of Appeals here in Atlanta before the defense team finally got the Supreme Court to agree to hear the case.

Under 18 U.S.C. §853(e), when a Defendant has already been charged in an indictment the prosector can file an ex parte motion seeking restraint of assets that are subject to forfeiture upon conviction. The law does not specifically allow for a pretrial adversarial hearing where the indicted defendant may challenge the propriety of the restraints.

Back in 1989, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that such pretrial restraint violated either the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989). However, a footnote in that case explicitly left open the question as to whether the Due Process Clause requires a hearing before a pretrial restraining order can be imposed. Since that time, the courts have issued contrary rulings resulting in a firmly entrenched split among the eleven circuits that have addressed the issue.

Ms. Kaley's defense team convinced the Supreme Court to accept her case in order to answer the following question:

"When a post-indictment, ex parte restraining order freezes assets needed by a criminal defendant to retain counsel of choice, do the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a pretrial, adversarial hearing at which the defendant may challenge the evidentiary support and legal theory of the underlying charges?"

This case has huge ramifications in situations where the feds go after Defendants with enough funds to hire good lawyers, but those attorneys cannot be paid because a judge agrees with the prosecutors to freeze the assets even without hearing from the defense. We will follow the case closely.

Here we go again, the intersection of the Eighteenth Century concept of privacy enshrined in our Fourth Amendment (no searches or seizures except when done pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause) versus the modern "CSI" world where investigators take biological shards to solve the most difficult of crimes. Today, the Supreme Court hears arguments in Marlyand v. King.

Most of the states along with the federal government have laws that provide for automatic DNA collection from people at the time of their arrest. The King case argued today asks the question whether it is unconstitutional to do that without a warrant, for the sole purpose of checking the DNA against a national DNA crime scene database.

Earlier cases all decided that that police can conduct such tests once an individual is convicted. (It's true, your Blogger lost one of these early cases, back in 2006). The King case asks whether the same is true for people arrested but not yet tried or convicted.

Here's what happened. The police arrested Mr. King in on assault charges. Using state law, they swabbed King's cheek to get a DNA sample, and then submitted the sample to the federal DNA database to see if there were any matches. The database eventually matched King's DNA to biological material from a rape six years earlier. The prosecutors used the DNA match against Mr. King, who was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for the rape.

The Maryland Court of Appeals threw out King's conviction. The state court noted that King was presumed innocent at the time of the initial arrest and that his DNA was not taken to prove that charge. The Maryland court held that the DNA collection was nothing more than a state fishing expedition for anything prosecutors could catch.

Again, this is a never-ending debate, encompassing the tension between personal privacy and the desires of Twenty-First Century crime fighters. We tend to forget that these cases almost always arise in the context of a seemingly guilty person's appeal of a horrible crime. However, if they can take DNA from a "bad" person, they can do the same thing to a "good" citizen who is falsely arrested. It does not take a lot of imagination to come up with scenarios where DNA can later be used against this "good" person, and if Mr. King loses this case, that will almost certainly happen.